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Pupilles de l’Empire: Debating the Provision for Child Victims of the Great War in the French 
Empire  
Abstract:  
In July 1917 French legislators conferred a special legal status on those children whose parent(s) 
had died or been brutally mutilated while defending the Patrie: pupille de la Nation. In metropolitan 
France, the state, working closely with pre-existing philanthropic organizations, would develop a 
system of provision for these children based on a legal right to full compensation for the loss 
they had endured. In the colonies, however, the application of the program would prove far 
more problematic. This article uses the correspondence between the Ministry of the Colonies 
and colonial administrators across the empire to trace the debate surrounding a possible colonial 
version of the program. It contends that colonial administrators mobilized racial prejudice and 
cultural particularism, to different extents in different colonies, in order to water down the state's 
duty of care to its child victims of war, the pupilles de l'empire. 
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In July 27, 1917, the French National Assembly created a new legal category, unparalleled in 
other belligerent countries, to compensate those children who had lost a parent to the horrors of 
war or whose father had been brutally mutilated on the battlefields: the pupille de la Nation.1 The 
legislative architecture and social infrastructure that developed to define and to cater for the 
pupilles centred on the notion that the state had contracted a “sacred debt” toward the sons and 
daughters of the citizen-soldiers who had fallen or been seriously wounded in defence of the 
Patrie. This “social duty born of the war” obliged the state to provide to these children a “double 
reparation,” both “material” and “moral.” Crucially, these children “were not assistés,” the objects 
of state charity, but rather rights holders to whom the state owed compensation.2 But where then 
did the children of the war dead and mutilés from the colonies fit in this schema? The varying 
political and civil statuses of their fathers, ranging from full citizenship to the most limited 
political rights, meant that the application of the pupilles de la Nation program in the empire was a 
slow, complex, and revealing process. 
 
Touching on issues as central to systems of colonial rule as citizenship rights, race, military 
service, the politics of the family, and the ideological underpinnings of empire, the debates 
surrounding the program's application in the empire offer a fascinating insight into how colonial 
administrators and their counterparts in Paris conceived of the relationship between the republic 
and the colonials who had defended her. While scholarship around the Great War has 
increasingly focused on the participation of colonial peoples in this global conflict and the 
political implications of this contribution in the interwar period, little attention has been paid to 
the practicalities of post-war provision in the imperial context.3 In this article I hope to go a little 
way toward filling this lacuna, using the story of the pupilles de l'empire to underline the 
complexities and contradictions that shaped French imperial policy in the wake of the Great 
War. 
 
Perhaps the greatest of these contradictions was the long-standing tension between the rival 
imperial ideals of “association” and “assimilation.” As Martin Thomas has pointed out, 
“Assimilationism and associationism threw up too many paradoxes to be articulated as distinct 
ideologies of colonialism” but, rather, should be imagined as distinct and by no means 
immutable guiding principles for colonial rule.4 The policy of “association” envisaged a colonial 
system in which French officials governed in alliance with existing traditional elites, themselves 
often deeply intertwined with the colonial regime, to foster development in the colonies while 
also supposedly respecting indigenous culture and tradition. It was a vision in which the cultural 
particularism of subject peoples trumped French aspirations to universalism. In contrast, 
“assimilation” was predicated on the extension of metropolitan institutions and education to the 
colonies with a view to eventually integrating indigenous peoples into the French nation and thus 
granting them the universal rights that were key to French republican ideology.5 While these two 
ideologies seem to directly contradict each other, they would, in fact, be applied in various 
complex combinations throughout the history of the French Empire, simultaneously working in 
tandem and struggling against each other. A blend of ideological flexibility and political 
expediency meant that a commitment to universalism and cultural particularism often coexisted 
in colonial policy, both as professed in Paris and as practiced in the colonies. 
 
In particular, the interwar period saw the emergence of a specific form of “association” that was 
not defined by its opposition to assimilation or by the rejection of the notion that colonial 
subjects might one day be “fit” for assimilation but, rather, saw progress toward this goal as best 
achieved by involving indigenous chiefs and respecting their customs.6 This “assimilationist” end 
goal may have distinguished French policy theoretically from similar colonial technologies of 
rule, such as “indirect rule” in the British Empire or even “institutional segregation” in Jan 
Smuts's South Africa, but its practice was fundamentally the same.7 The “associationist turn” was 
grounded in a practical reassessment of the best way to rule the colony, drawing heavily on the 
influence of ethnological “sciences,” which constituted specific visions of how indigenous 
societies and families should be ideally organized.8 When colonial administrators sought to apply 
the pupilles de la nation program to their territories, these visions would feature prominently in 
their discourse. 
 
Using the correspondence between colonial administrators and the Ministry of the Colonies, I 
argue that, while the program's projected application varied widely across the empire, its 
dominant feature was the undermining, if not total denial, of the right to provision in favour of a 
limited concession of assistance to those in need. Furthermore, I contend that this dilution of the 
universal right of the pupille is symptomatic of the triumph of “association” over French 
universalism in the interwar empire. As we shall see, colonial officials across the vast and 
complex administrative network that was the French Empire would employ arguments based on 
the cultural particularism of the populations they governed to minimize the state's duty to 
indigenous war orphans. Administrators mobilized racialized conceptions of family structure and 
indigenous systems of provision that were strikingly similar across the length and breadth of the 
empire in order to justify the colonial state's failure to apply a supposedly universal right to the 
pupilles de l'empire. 
 
While the focus on the correspondence between colonial officials undoubtedly obscures the 
already near silent voices of colonial ayants droits, often the most marginal figures in colonial 
society (children and widows), it does illuminate the contrasts and commonalities that defined 
administrative attitudes toward colonial populations across the empire.9 Although the number of 
children involved was relatively small and the interest of most colonial administrators extremely 
limited, the pupilles de l'empire lay at the intersection of a whole complex of issues, both 
metropolitan and colonial, that emerged in the wake of the French experience of the Great 
War.10 The administrators' attempts to shape a policy on the pupilles, by juggling the various 
interests of colonial authorities, their competing understandings of the familial and societal 
structures of their indigenous subjects, and the acknowledgment of a need to recognize some 
form of “reciprocal national obligation” born of participation in the war, retain a crucial interest 
for the historian of the interwar empire.11 
 
If we are to consider the imperial dimension of the pupilles program, we must first look to its 
origins in the metropole. One of the defining features of the complex legislation and institutions 
that emerged to cater for victims of the Great War in France was the notion of a “right to 
provision.” The philosophy of solidarisme advocated by the Radical deputy and sociologist Léon 
Bourgeois had a key influence on the development of post-war provision in general and the 
pupilles de la nation in particular.12 In line with Bourgeois's theories, legislators were clear in their 
emphasis that the state's engagement with the pupilles de la nation was to be rights based and not 
a form of charity.13 In this regard, the distinction between the pupille de la Nation and the older 
category of the pupille de l'assistance publique was crucial. Throughout the nineteenth century, the 
various regimes that held power in France began to organize, in both legal and practical terms, 
the increasing state intervention in the lives of needy children, culminating in the creation, in 
June 1904, of the category pupille de l'assistance publique.14 Where these wards of the state were 
subjects of charity to be disciplined and formed by the state, the pupilles de la Nation, by virtue of 
Article 1 of the 1917 law, enjoyed “a right to the state's moral and material support.”15 However, 
when the Ministry of the Colonies called on the colonial administrators to identify how the 
republic could meet its duty to its colonial subjects and citizens, the solutions they offered 
evoked cultural and racial difference to blur the boundaries between these categories. In many 
cases “moral and material support” would morph into assistance or even non-interference. 
 
The distinction drawn between pupilles de la nation and wards of the state had implications for 
more than the quantity and quality of services offered to the beneficiaries of state intervention. 
In sharp contrast to both the spirit and the practice that shaped state interaction with pupilles de 
l'assistance publique, the law governing pupilles de la nation asserted that the state's involvement was 
to be complementary and not contrary to parental authority. The sanctity of the family, shaken 
by the experience of the war, could not be further undermined by the action of the state. The 
families themselves would initiate the proceedings (free of charge) to ensure the child's adoption 
by the state as a pupille de la Nation.16 Here the term adoption had no bearing on the guardianship 
of the child but, rather, was a symbolic expression of the French nation's commitment to care 
for the child it had “adopted.”17 The family would play a key role in the stewardship of the child 
through the institution of the conseil de famille that directed each pupille, and even in those cases 
where the appointed tuteur for the child came from outside the family, he or she could not act 
against the wishes of the family.18 In cases where the child was left without any living parent, the 
French state was charged with organizing a form of family-based fostering, known as placement 
familial, which rejected institutionalizing war orphans in favour of maintaining the sanctity of the 
family, whether adoptive or biological.19 The state's intervention was not to compromise the legal 
and moral priority of the family. 
 
Nevertheless, the program did constitute an attempt by the state to adopt a form of parental 
role. At its heart lay the notion that the state had a duty not only to compensate the financial 
consequences of loss through a pension but also to “fill the gap” left by the figure of the 
incapacitated or deceased father.20 This desire to offset the devastation caused by the loss or 
mutilation of the father, the key difference between the program of the pupilles and other forms 
of provision for war orphans, implied a particular understanding of the role of a father and his 
importance in the life of a child.21 When the task of adjusting the program for application in the 
empire fell to colonial administrators, their conceptions of indigenous familial structure, 
especially the place of the father in indigenous families and societies, would play a key role in 
undermining the commitment to the universal right of the pupille. 
 
Post-war Provision in the Empire: Universal Rights versus Colonial Exceptionalism 
Before we explore the debates surrounding the application of the July 1917 law across the 
empire, we must consider more generally the systems, structures, and political understandings 
that would shape post-war provision across France's colonies. The prospective pupilles de la 
nation were just a small element in a much wider group of colonial subjects and citizens who 
could claim special rights in light of their participation in the war. The mass mobilization of 
society in the metropole had given rise to a new language of claims making, focused principally, 
but not exclusively, on social and economic claims. 22In the colonial context political claims, 
specifically those seeking to redefine the relationship between colony and metropole, drew new 
strength from the colonial contribution to national defence.23 Political actors such as Blaise 
Diagne in French West Africa, the Emir Khaled in Algeria, and the Ligue Française pour l'Accession 
des Indigènes de Madagascar aux Droits de Citoyen evoked the republican tradition of the impôt du 
sang, tying military service to citizenship, to advocate the extension of political and civil rights to 
colonial subjects.24 Alongside these openly political and potentially divisive campaigns, the monde 
ancien combattant in the empire also made its stand for the financial rights of colonial ayants droits.25 
 
The impact of the war had varied widely across the empire, with the quantity of indigenous men 
having served in the French army, the conditions in which they were recruited/conscripted, and 
the capacities in which they served differing radically by colony. The colonies of North Africa 
and West Africa led the way in terms of recruitment, with well over a hundred thousand troops 
from each serving in Europe, largely as frontline soldiers.26 The next largest contribution came 
from Indochina and Madagascar, with each territory mobilizing over forty thousand men during 
the conflict.27 Judged by French military authorities to be less racially inclined to warfare than 
North and West Africans, troops from Madagascar and Indochina often fulfilled auxiliary roles, 
rarely seeing frontline combat.28 The number of troops raised in the rest of the empire was 
extremely limited.29 The uneven participation in the war by indigenous peoples across the empire 
would impact both the distribution of colonial rights among the different colonies and the 
systems of provision developed to cater for them. 
 
Both the legislation governing and the organizations representing veterans and the victims of war 
across the empire reflected this variety of experience. The indigenous subjects of the Maghreb 
were relatively privileged compared with their counterparts elsewhere; the pension law of March 
1919 guaranteed equal pensions for the mutilés of North Africa, regardless of race, religion, or 
political status.30 This equality was not extended to other ayants droits, with the French 
government citing polygamy and other particularisms of the indigenous family structure to justify 
inferior pensions for the dependents of the war dead.31 Nevertheless, the presence of large 
numbers of veterans of European origin who were full French citizens ensured a certain level of 
quality to services, while indigenous participation in cross-community veterans' organizations 
granted them a platform to pursue equal rights.32 The legislation governing the rest of the empire 
made a clear distinction between the rights of colonial citizens, which were assimilated to those 
of metropolitan veterans, and indigenous ayants droits, who were to be paid less in accordance 
with their supposedly reduced needs.33 Across the empire, the relationship between ayants droits, 
particularly indigenous subjects but also to a certain extent colonial citizens, and the colonial 
administration can be defined by what Gregory Mann has called “idioms of mutual if uneven 
obligation.”34 All sides recognized the transformative nature of the war, which forged a new 
relationship that more closely approached the form of social contract (theoretically) in place in 
the metropole. New rights were born of participation in the war, though what exactly these 
rights were was very much contested. A form of dialogue was opened between the colonial 
administration and veterans. This dialogue did not imply dissolution of the colonial hierarchy. As 
Mann points out: “The language of mutual obligation and interdependence is and has always 
been fraught with misunderstandings, malentendus and moments of false confidence in which one 
group or another believes that it is finally being heard and understood.”35 Nonetheless, the 
authorities did acknowledge, even if only theoretically, that the colonial soldier who had 
participated in the war, and to a lesser extent his dependents, had a special claim on the colonial 
state. Throughout the interwar period, the various colonial administrations would seek to balance 
the need to recognize this claim with the restriction of rights and financial constraints necessary 
for the smooth operation of a strictly hierarchical colonial society. 
 
When in July 1917 the National Assembly established the status of the pupille de la Nation, the 
tension between the principles of universalism and association were evident in its projected 
application to the empire. On the one hand, legislators were in no doubt that the new program 
should apply wherever the tricolour flew, embracing all the peoples who had fought for France. 
Article 30 stated: “The benefits of this law are extended to the children of French subjects and 
inhabitants of the protectorates as well as the children of foreigners who participated for the 
duration of the war in the armies of France.”36 On the other hand, it was acknowledged that the 
cultural and, in particular, the legal specificities of each colony would require adapted legislation, 
especially regarding the process of “adoption” that accompanied the granting of the status of 
pupille de la Nation. The second paragraph of Article 30 was clear in this respect: “However, the 
dispositions concerning the organization of the tutelle would be applied to them only within the 
limits of their personal status.”37 Nevertheless, both the spirit and the provisions of the law 
seemed to be overwhelmingly universalist in character. It seemed that the children of colonial 
subjects would enjoy all the same privileges and advantages offered to those of French citizens in 
the metropole. Could this be another victory for the indigénophiles who, working closely with 
indigenous actors such as Blaise Diagne, had been using the colonial wartime contribution to 
push a creeping equality into the French legislative framework?38 On the surface, at least, the 
legislative application of the pupille de la Nation in the colonies seemed to fit into this agenda. 
 
However, the authorities in both Paris and the colonies soon realized the implications—financial, 
political, and social—that the implementation of an unaltered version of the pupille program 
would have in the empire. The conseil d'état moved to amend the law in November 1917, inserting 
a paragraph stipulating that the conditions of the program in the colonies would be subject to 
further legislation at a later date, which, in effect, invalidated any attempt to apply the legislation 
as it stood to the colonies.39 The Ministry of the Colonies issued instructions to administrators 
across the empire drawing their attention to this amendment and justifying the limitation of the 
program by claiming the original law had initially been misinterpreted: 
As a result of the generous terms in which the text was framed, it seemed applicable 
to the colonies, but a deeper examination of the new law has revealed that this 
interpretation was inexact; indeed, the legislator did not expressly stipulate that this 
act was applicable to our overseas possessions, and in these conditions, Article 30 
concerns only the children of French subjects who are in the Metropole. Moreover, 
it appears that numerous elements of the law were elaborated with an exclusively 
metropolitan point of view and that they could be realized in the colonies only once 
adapted to the administrative organization of these territories and local necessities.40 
The amendment had two serious implications for implementation of the program in the 
colonies. First, the principle of the universal rights of the pupilles was undermined by the fact that 
the regimes that would be applied in each colony would differ both from one another and from 
that in place in the metropole. While this was to a certain extent the product of a cynical move to 
row back on a universal principle that was financially costly, administratively complex, and 
ideologically dangerous, it also reflected a recognition that the needs of the prospective pupilles in 
the colonies were quite different from those of their metropolitan counterparts. In principle, an 
adapted regime did not inevitably mean a less advantageous program for indigenous pupilles (even 
if this was almost always the case in practice). Neither did it necessarily mean that the automatic 
rights of the pupilles were compromised by their inferior political and legal statuses. In fact, an 
adapted regime could, in theory, successfully fulfil the brief of the program, “to provide moral 
and material support,” without encroaching on the essential structures of indigenous family and 
society (as imagined by French administrators). 
 
Second, the task of adapting the program fell to colonial administrators. Where certain politicians 
in Paris, particularly in the dying years of the war and in its immediate aftermath, were inclined 
toward the application of universal republican principles to colonial subjects, especially those 
who participated in the war, administrators in many parts of the empire had come to adopt 
policies focused on the cultivation of traditional elites. The particular understanding individual 
colonial administrators had of the structures of power, on both a societal and a familial level, that 
should rule over indigenous subjects would play a major role in shaping their application of the 
program. 
 
In a structure as complex and varied as the French Empire, it was inevitable that diverse 
administrative bodies would govern the extension of the program of the pupilles de la Nation to 
different territories. Even the earliest attempts to organize the program's application to the 
empire would bear testament to a plurality of administrative approaches across the colonies. 
While the task of coordinating the rollout of the program in most of the French Empire fell to 
the Ministry of the Colonies, which organized a consultation with colonial administrators in 
February 1918, French possessions in the Maghreb did not come under the remit of the 
ministry.41 Algeria, home to a significant population of both European and indigenous ayants 
droits, was officially integrated fully into the republic and thus would closely follow metropolitan 
models in its application of the program. Similarly, the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia 
would pursue a policy deeply marked by metropolitan practices. The case of Indochina also 
stands apart from the rest of the French Empire. The administration in Indochina under 
Governor-General Albert Sarraut offered in late 1918 to assume the role of coordinating, 
organizing, and financing the application of the program throughout its territories.42 This offer 
was happily accepted by the Ministry of the Colonies, and thus responsibility was devolved to 
Hanoi, where the administration had already called for submissions from local officials on how 
best to realize the program.43 These different administrative approaches served in themselves to 
undermine any prospect of the application of a universal program across the French Empire, 
with the structures of colonial rule themselves militating against the establishment of a common 
colonial policy for the pupilles de la Nation. 
 
The various consultations and projects that would be organized by the different administrative 
structures across the empire would reveal a range of opinions among colonial administrators 
around the central aim of the program: rights-based provision for the pupilles. Certain territories 
seemed committed to this principle for all of their prospective pupilles, regardless of race or 
political status. The law instituting the program in Algeria directly replicated the provisions of 
Article 30 of the Law of July 1917, differentiating for the indigenous population only when it 
came to the procedure of adoption, which would be carried out by a qadi or traditional judge in 
accordance with Islamic law or Berber custom.44 In Morocco, the Dahir of November 1, 1920, 
regulating the application of the pupilles de la Nation made no specific differentiation between 
European and indigenous pupilles.45 The beylical decree of February 25, 1919, applied much the 
same model to the Protectorate of Tunisia.46 While there is no direct evidence as to why the law 
did not concretely differentiate between the advantages to be granted to indigenous pupilles and 
their European counterparts, we may suggest that the egalitarian spirit of the Pension Law of 
March 1919 influenced the application of the program across North Africa. Furthermore, the 
existence of large European populations across the Maghreb meant that the colonial 
administration would have been obliged to construct an infrastructure for the European pupilles 
in any case, and thus the inclusion of indigenous pupilles in the general program was less onerous 
than may have been the case elsewhere. The regime adopted, in all its varieties, across North 
Africa sought to adapt but not radically reconstitute the law as originally formulated in July 1917. 
Local customary law was to be respected, but this would not compromise the universal 
commitment to the rights of the pupilles. 
 
The same spirit was found in the reports submitted by the resident superior in Cambodia and the 
governor of the neighboring colony, Cochinchina. For the administration in Phnom Penh, the 
indigenous population had acquired “incontestable rights” through their fathers' participation in 
the war, and thus “the general measures proposed would apply fully to indigenous pupilles.”47 
Across the border in Cochinchina, the project presented sought to “preserve the directing 
principles followed in the metropole” and did not specifically distinguish between citizens and 
subjects.48 In important territories at different ends of the empire, therefore, the commitment to 
a universal and equal right to special provision for all prospective pupilles was supported by 
colonial administrations in theory (if not always in practice). 
 
Challenging the Universal Right to Provision 
Elsewhere in the empire, reports submitted by colonial administrators evoked a whole range of 
justifications for fundamentally limiting the application of the program in their colonies. Four 
principal arguments were mobilized by colonial administrators to counter the extension of a 
wider rights-based form of intervention by the state on the behalf of prospective pupilles. First, 
certain colonial administrators sought to minimize the “sacred debt” owed by the state to the 
indigenous by diminishing the communal contribution of these populations during the war. 
Second, colonial administrators invoked the poor infrastructure, both bureaucratic and social, in 
place in certain colonies to defend the impossibility of extending the program to their territories. 
The final two tropes that constantly crop up in the reports of colonial administrators hostile to 
the program are deeply intertwined, reflecting the interwar colonial officials' very particular views 
on indigenous familial and social structures: communal culture and the role of the father in the 
indigenous family. We now turn to examples of these arguments proffered by administrations 
across the empire. 
 
The strategy of minimizing indigenous losses to protect the power of entrenched colonial elites 
was a consistent feature of the rhetoric of the anticolonial reform lobby after the Great War. In 
Algeria, certain leaders of the antireform press called into question the indigenous contribution 
to the war, in terms of both the number of indigenous losses and the conditions under which 
indigenous troops had been recruited, in their campaign against political reform in the colony.49 
The opponents of political reform in Senegal also sought to undermine the contribution of that 
colony's indigenous troops to the war effort.50 In May 1918 Martial Henri Merlin, then serving as 
governor-general of Madagascar (one of many postings in a long colonial career), echoed these 
arguments in a letter to the minister of the colonies, declaring the institution of the pupilles de la 
Nation to be “neither necessary nor desirable” in his territory.51 He claimed that while the law 
should clearly be applicable to French “nationals” and “foreigners” who had volunteered for 
France, this was not the case for indigenous troops who had received a prime or enrolment 
payment from the fokonolona (traditional communal administration) in accordance with “an 
ancestral tradition.”52 By evoking the prime, he sought to differentiate the citizen soldier who 
had fought and died for love of the Patrie from the indigenous soldier, who was essentially a 
mercenary and thus not entitled to the compensation of the state. Furthermore, he highlighted 
the “small numbers of Malagasies killed in the line of fire or behind the lines,” suggesting that 
indigenous losses were limited to 616, the vast majority of whom had not died at the front 
(Jacques Frémeaux offers a figure closer to 2,500).53 However, such opinions ran counter to the 
official narrative promoted across the empire that celebrated the loyalty of colonial troops as 
proof of the unity and strength of French rule.54 The governor-general of Madagascar would be 
more or less alone in his use of the denigration of the indigenous contribution to the war to 
undermine the extension of rights to his indigenous subjects. There were plenty of other means 
of justifying the limitation of the program in the colonies. 
 
For many colonial administrators, the weakness of colonial structures in their territories was in 
itself a justification for the abdication of their duties to prospective pupilles. In French Equatorial 
Africa, Governor-General Gabriel Louis Angoulvant pointed to the “extremely rudimentary civil 
register” in existence for the indigenous population as a factor militating against the full adoption 
of the program in his territory.55 The governor of New Caledonia also evoked the lack of a civil 
register to justify the application of a special regime to the Kanak population.56His equivalent in 
the French Somali Coast (Djibouti) used his administration's lack of authority to completely 
exclude his subjects from the program. He claimed it was impossible to establish if any of the 
war dead had left children behind, and even if this could be clarified, most of the troops had 
come from Abyssinia or Italian Eritrea, and thus their children could not practicably benefit 
from state intervention in the territory. Therefore, the program was “not applicable” in the 
colony.57 In these territories the past failings of the colonial regime were mobilized to ensure its 
future failure to provide rights-based provision to indigenous populations. 
 
In most colonies, however, arguments predicated on the particularities of indigenous societal and 
familial structures would be most persistently and most effectively mobilized by colonial 
administrators. Citing their expertise in local cultures, these administrators evoked deeply 
racialized and essentialised visions of cultural practices among the populations they ruled, mostly 
subjects but even citizens, to dilute their duty of care to prospective pupilles. 
 
Chief among these visions was the notion that the “communal” nature of indigenous society 
made the program's provisions unnecessary in the colonial territories. Governor-General Merlin 
of Madagascar claimed that “above all . . . it is the social and familial organization of the 
indigenous that renders the institution of the pupilles in Madagascar pointless.” He affirmed that 
the situation of a war orphan in an indigenous community was not comparable to that of his or 
her French counterpart: 
While in the metropole, the orphan is abandoned without resources and can most 
often survive only thanks to public assistance, in Madagascar the orphan is always 
taken in by his close relatives or by the community [the fokonolona], and in both 
cases he is raised with as much care as by his parents. The need for assistance does 
not present itself in the same way for Malagasy orphans as it does for French 
orphans in France.58 
The sentiments expressed by the administration in Madagascar were echoed across the empire. 
In August 1918 the governor of New Caledonia wrote to the minister insisting that the program 
should distinguish between “French victims of war and the children of the indigenous.”59 Once 
more, it was claimed that the “tribe” was best placed “to offer resources and moral protection” 
to the child. Furthermore, the kind of “natural solidarity” evoked by Merlin in Madagascar was 
also supposedly present among the indigenous of New Caledonia, where “individual property 
does not exist” and the “child enjoys the fruits of collective property.”60 In 1919 Merlin, by then 
promoted to the position of governor-general of French West Africa, asserted that the child 
victims of war among the population he now governed were “not orphans in the ‘French sense’ 
of the word” because the community would always assume the burden of providing for them.61 
For his part, the resident superior of Annam affirmed that “in practical terms, the question of 
the ‘pupilles de la Nation’ is not relevant in Annam,” as “it can be presumed that familial assistance 
will never be lacking for the child.”62 This attitude was not confined to the subject populations of 
the empire. In the “old colonies” of the Antilles, Guyana, and Réunion, the local citizens, largely 
of African and métis, or mixed, origins, were said to exhibit a form of “natural hospitality” that 
would ensure the program's application would remain limited in these territories.63 
 
Colonial administrators ruling over populations of diverse religious, cultural, and geographic 
backgrounds and even with different legal positions within the imperial framework mobilized 
ethnographic stereotypes of communal living to disregard the universal right of the pupille to 
provision. Undoubtedly, societal and familial structures across the empire differed significantly 
from the idealized European model on which the program was based, but they also differed 
radically among one another. It is most striking that colonial administrators, from one end of the 
empire to the other, presented the same image of an “indigenous” family and society where 
communal practices rendered the application of the rights-based provision enshrined in the law 
irrelevant, if not pernicious. Instead, the indigenous should be left to look after themselves. 
 
This valorisation of indigenous societal structures of provision was doubly useful to colonial 
administrations. On the one hand, it sat comfortably with the prevailing policy of “civilization 
through association,” devolving responsibility to pre-existing, conservative power structures that 
would preserve, if not enhance, French prestige.64 On the other hand, it allowed colonial 
administrations to abdicate most of their responsibilities toward indigenous pupilles, not only 
significantly reducing a potential financial burden but also preventing the emergence of another 
potentially disruptive class of évolués, “evolved” educated elites, with a particularly potent claim 
for political rights. The defence of indigenous institutions permitted colonial administrations to 
argue that, in Merlin's words, any intervention by the state would “go against the natural order of 
things” and be resented by the indigenous population.65 His counterpart in French Equatorial 
Africa, Governor-General Angoulvant, would go even farther, claiming that, with the exception 
of access to education, all other interventions would constitute an affront to the “freedom of 
life” that was the rule among the indigenous and would be perceived as a punishment, not a 
form of assistance.66 Thus the authorities' abdication of their duty of care was portrayed as a 
policy that protected indigenous culture by not imposing the ideals of “European organization” 
in the place of the “natural solidarity” of the indigenous populations.67 Indeed, the application 
(or lack thereof) of the program for the pupilles de la Nation in these colonies can, in many ways, 
be seen as a microcosm for the wider policy of association in the interwar empire. What was 
billed as a means of preserving local culture, respecting indigenous power structures, and 
enhancing the lives of the most marginal figures in colonial society was little more than an escape 
clause from a universal right imposed by a distant and (in colonial administrations' thinking) 
overly idealistic parliament in Paris. 
 
In the argumentation of those colonial administrators hostile to the program, an idealized 
version of indigenous society where legal rights were unnecessary to guarantee provision was 
contrasted with a negative view of an individualized metropole where only the state could ensure 
the care of society's most worthy marginalized figures: the war orphans. A fetishized vision of 
indigenous societies suggested that they possessed a “natural solidarity” far greater than that 
present in metropolitan society. One gets the impression from reading the correspondence 
surrounding the program in the colonies that French families in the metropole simply abandoned 
child victims of war, something that not only was patently untrue but also contradicted the spirit, 
the letter, and the practice of the law of the pupilles de la Nation itself.68 It was in the interest of 
certain colonial administrators to draw the sharpest contrast possible between an individualized 
society where a rights-based approach is necessary for war orphans faced with abandonment and 
neglect without the intervention of the state and a communal society where customs replace 
rights and state intervention would do more harm than good. This approach betrays a key aspect 
of colonial administrators' (mis)understanding of the program as a whole and of its application in 
the colonies. For most of the colonial cadres who participated in the ministry's consultation, the 
program of the pupille de la nation was about providing assistance to war orphans. The concept 
of a rights-based provision had largely disappeared in the journey between metropole and 
colony, replaced by a weak commitment to assistance and an enthusiastic devolvement of 
responsibility to indigenous community structures. 
 
The communal understanding would also have major implications for one of the minor features 
of the program of the pupilles de la Nation, placement familial, a form of fostering or adoption for 
war orphans left without any parent. In his circulaire establishing an empire-wide consultation on 
the program, the minister of the colonies had specifically called for clarification of the 
implementation of placement familial in each territory.69 In most of those territories where the 
colonial administrators evoked the important role of the community in the care of orphans, 
placement familial was considered incompatible with indigenous culture.70 Nevertheless, in 
Cambodia, where the resident superior seemed largely committed to equal rights for indigenous 
pupilles and made no mention of communal culture, placement familial was approved “as within 
the social mores of the inhabitants.”71 His colleague in Annam, a strong proponent of the 
communal vision of indigenous society and an advocate of a very restricted application of the 
program, pursued a policy somewhere between the two extremes, favouring an inclusion of 
placement familial in the legislative framework of the program but asserting that it would be used 
sparingly.72 The issue of placement familial is crucial as a link between colonial administrators' 
understandings of indigenous families and the societal structures in which they lived. In the 
metropole, the policy sought to reinforce the importance of the nuclear family as the site for 
child rearing. Its rejection in much of the empire bears testament to a strongly held belief that 
communal forms of rule supplanted the family as the basic structure in indigenous societies, a 
belief that had serious implications for another, more central aspect of the program: “filling the 
gap” left by the father.73 
 
Colonial administrators who were hostile to the application of the pupilles de la nation were quick 
to undermine its central justification, the reparation for the loss or incapacitation of the father, 
by arguing his role, and indeed the role of biological parents, was nowhere near as important in 
the indigenous family as in its European equivalent. As governor-general in Madagascar, Merlin 
was harshly critical of the father in his assessment of indigenous familial structures. If the pupilles' 
right to compensation originated in the loss of the father, this was, Merlin claimed, not 
applicable in the Malagasy context because “contrary to what happens in the metropole, the 
death of the father almost never deprives the family of its usual resources.”74 Furthermore, if the 
program was viewed as a means of reconstructing and reinforcing the nuclear family unit in the 
metropole, in Madagascar it would only perpetuate an undesirable model of family that shunned 
monogamy and often saw women take another man in the absence of their husband (thus also 
providing a new father for the orphan).75 His colleague Angoulvant in French Equatorial Africa 
argued that the father was a marginal figure in the life of an indigenous child, given that in 
animist culture “the child does not belong to the father, and marriage is only a rental of the wife 
by the husband.”76 Shortly after, writing in his capacity as governor-general of French West 
Africa, Merlin invoked the communal nature of African society to assert that the war dead “were 
simple members of a group, with the same status as their own children, and their death has not 
deprived the children of their natural support.”77 These arguments hint at the wider rationale 
behind the evacuation of the role of the father. This was not purely a strategy aimed at 
undermining the central justification of the program. It was also deeply entwined with the 
structures of power of the associationist system of rule. It was contended that paternal authority 
was shared collectively, with a particular emphasis on the paternal rights of chiefs, who just so 
happened to be the pillars of the policy of “association.” Here the whole of indigenous society 
was conceived of as a family, in which the paternal authority that rested with the chiefs applied 
not just to minors but to all of the community. Thus the loss of a biological father was largely 
irrelevant, as the role equivalent to a father in the metropole was supposedly played by the 
leaders of the community, in close cooperation with the colonial authorities. There was no gap to 
fill. 
 
Imperial “Inbetweeners”: Colonial Citizens, the Métis, and the Program of the Pupilles de la Nation 
The empire was not only home to indigenous populations; it also governed various groups of 
French citizens and people of mixed race. While the clarification of the rules governing 
indigenous populations would be a lengthy and complex process, the principle governing French 
citizen pupilles de la nation was at least theoretically quite simple. Appearing in various forms in 
the decrees instituting the program across the empire, French citizen pupilles were to be entitled 
to the same treatment as their counterparts in the metropole.78 In practical terms, however, they 
already suffered a disadvantage given how long it took to organize the institutions and services in 
the colonies. When the program was up and running in the empire, the governing authorities 
advocated different approaches to provision for the citizen pupille. 
 
The ever-reticent Merlin pointed to the small numbers and relative wealth of the European 
population in French West Africa, arguing that the colonial administration would always 
intervene in cases of great need and thus that this particular law was largely irrelevant. The 
government should limit its provision to scholarships.79 Even for prospective pupilles of 
European origin, Merlin conceived of the program in terms of assistance and not rights. In 
Indochina, administrators stressed the importance of a form of repatriation to the metropole for 
citizen pupilles, given that, as the resident superior in Cambodia put it, “the son of a European 
would never be able to live permanently in Indochina” (note here the assumption that the pupille 
was male—the female pupille is almost completely absent from the official correspondence).80 For 
his counterpart in Tonkin, any citizen (or indeed métis) pupille who “was not susceptible to form 
part of the elite” should be sent back to France.81 In contrast, this same policy was not pursued 
in North Africa, where the large European population and extensive education infrastructure 
rendered repatriation unnecessary. A young European pupille of working-class background, such 
as perhaps the most famous pupille of them all, Albert Camus, could receive the education and 
provision necessary to compensate the loss of his father without ever leaving his local area. 
 
Not all citizens in the empire were of European origin, and the application of the program to the 
diverse groups of colonial citizens was the source of much confusion. Senegal stood apart from 
the rest of Africa due to the special legal regime governing the Four Communes of Dakar, 
Rufisque, Gorée, and Saint-Louis, France's oldest African settlements. In contrast to the majority 
of Senegal's population living outside these cities, the indigenous inhabitants of the Four 
Communes, known as the originaires, had benefited from the extension of a limited form of 
citizenship under the Second Republic. It was only in 1916, following a lengthy campaign by 
their champion Blaise Diagne, that the full citizenship of this group was recognized in legislation. 
When it came to the application of the program of the pupilles de la nation, Diagne raised 
concerns with Governor-General Merlin that the legislation seemed to prioritize foreigners of 
European origin over the citizens of the Four Communes, something he was assured was not the 
case. The originaires were legally entitled to the same treatment as citizens of European origin, 
unlike the indigenous subject population in the rest of Senegal.82 However, as Merlin envisaged 
only the most minor form of provision for European pupilles, this was hardly a significant bonus 
for the originaires. 
 
We have already seen how, in the case of the children of French colonial citizens in the “old 
colonies,” administrators echoed the opinions expressed by their counterparts across the empire 
by evoking the “natural hospitality” of local populations. According to the ministry, the program 
would have a limited application in these territories due both to the small numbers of war 
orphans and to the fact that “all the families know each other and come to each other's aid, with 
tradition ensuring that the most privileged take on those whom the vagaries of life have 
especially disadvantaged.”83 Where state intervention was envisaged, it usually involved sending 
war orphans to orphanages, whether these were pre-existing philanthropic institutions or 
institutions specifically founded for this purpose.84 The equality of all French citizens before the 
law did not seem to apply to the pupilles de la nation. 
 
Even more problematic was the case of the métis or mixed-race population found in varying 
numbers across the empire. As Emmanuelle Saada has shown in her magisterial Empire's 
Children, the “métis question” was a key site in which colonial authorities attempted to delineate 
and define nationality and citizenship.85 For Saada, the case of nonrecognised métis, which lay at 
the intersection of hybridity and illegitimacy, placed the racial question firmly at the heart of legal 
debate.86 In terms of social provision, the implications of the legal status of the métis, 
unrecognized by his or her French father and thus subject to the mother's personal status as an 
indigène, were extremely important.87 The métis child's relegation in the eyes of the law to the 
same level as an indigenous child alarmed many prominent figures in colonial society.88 
Throughout the colonial period, colonial administrators, elites, and jurists would mobilize around 
the issue of the métis in certain territories, with the decade following the Great War representing 
the apex of an ultimately successful campaign to legally recognize the métis as French citizens.89 
Thus, when it came to the application of the program of the pupilles de la nation, the particular 
case of métis war orphans would prove a key concern for administrators in those territories where 
the métis community was central to public discourse. 
 
Providing for métis war orphans required placing them in the wider framework of the law 
governing the pupilles. Would they be assimilated to citizens of European origin resident in the 
colony, or would their conditions be closer to those of the indigenous community? In 
Madagascar, Merlin's administration intended to take special measures in favour of the métis “to 
ensure that this category of pupilles enjoys a more favourable regime than that envisaged for the 
indigenous” but not that which would be accorded to Europeans.90 It was in Indochina that the 
métis question had always received the most attention, and the case of the pupilles de la nation was 
no exception in this regard.91 In his report to Governor-General Sarraut in Hanoi, the resident 
superior of Cambodia, who was theoretically committed to total equality in the application of the 
law to both subjects and citizens, specifically stated the need to ensure that unrecognized métis 
“should have the same treatment as French citizens and can be sent to France in the same 
conditions.”92 In Tonkin, the question of the métis dominated correspondence about the 
organization of the program. The initial consultation organized by the resident superior of the 
territory not only included local politicians and members of the Chambers of Commerce and 
Agriculture (as was the case elsewhere in the colonies) but also specifically incorporated a 
representative of the Société des Métis.93 In the report for the governor-general that resulted from 
this consultation, the resident superior specifically addressed the “métis question,” arguing that 
“the benefit of the law should, it seems, be extended to these children who, without being 
legitimate or recognized, are in a certain way the sons of the victims and thus should enjoy the 
attention of the state.”94 Furthermore, he proposed the creation of a “second category” to 
govern the application of its principles to the métis, particularly in terms of the constitution of a 
conseil de famille. This was specifically differentiated from a potential third category that would, if 
necessary, encompass the indigenous.95 Of course, the priority of the métis over the indigenous 
had long been reflected in social provision across the empire.96 The novel aspect of the resident 
superior's proposal lies in its desire to recognize this priority through the creation of a specific 
legal category. If this had been incorporated into the law, it would in fact have preempted, by 
several years, the Decree of the Governor-General of Indochina of November 8, 1928, which 
recognized the claim to citizenship of métis on the basis of their racial origins, thus introducing 
the notion of race into French jurisprudence.97 The influence of the lobby that would secure this 
legal recognition of the citizenship of the métis is clear in his approach to the program of the 
pupilles de la nation.98 It also reflects a desire, shared by administrators in Cambodia and 
Madagascar, to adapt the law in favour of a population that stood outside the neat categories of 
“indigenous subject” and “European citizen.” 
 
One particularly fascinating aspect of the métis question is the contrast in the correspondence 
between the attitudes held by colonial administrations toward the European fathers of these 
children and the indigenous fathers of other war orphans. While those indigenous fathers who 
had fallen on the battlefields were negatively characterized as uninterested and unimportant in 
the lives of their children, the European fathers of métis children, who had largely abandoned 
their offspring, received no such criticism. The racialized understandings of family were more 
important to colonial administrations than the reality of the relationship between fathers and 
their children. 
 
A whole complex of racial, cultural, sexual, and political ideas about the métis coalesced in the 
minds of these administrators to form the demand for a special regime to be applied to the 
children of mixed race left without a father by the horrors of the war.99 As would subsequently 
be the case with legislation targeting the métis, these proposed regimes employed notions of race 
and filiation to widen the net of privilege within the colonies to a population hitherto legally 
excluded.100 However, as discussed below, qualifying for closer state intervention would not 
always prove beneficial for the children in question. 
 
Administering the Program in the Empire 
While children and families were supposedly at the centre of the program of the pupilles de la 
nation, the administration of the program in both metropole and colony would involve a whole 
swath of political and civil society figures. The structures designed to administer the program 
show a complex picture of the involvement of indigenous actors in the organization of provision 
for their own communities. Ironically, it was in those colonies most wedded to a devolved 
approach to provision that indigenous figures were most absent from the institutions set up to 
govern the program. In French Equatorial Africa, a territory in which the governor-general was 
convinced the program was not applicable, all members of the committee came from within the 
colonial administration, with no civil society organizations or elected officials.101 In French West 
Africa, Merlin was so sceptical about the application of the program to his territory that he failed 
to draw up plans for a comité colonial, drawing a reprimand from the ministry.102 By making 
indigenous communities responsible for the fate of their own war orphans, these colonial 
administrations had largely washed their hands of prospective indigenous pupilles, leaving the 
committees to focus almost solely on the very limited cases of European pupilles. 
 
Elsewhere in the empire, indigenous voices could influence systems of provision within the 
administrative committees, but these voices were carefully handpicked by colonial authorities. In 
Algeria, the alterations to the law would be relatively minor. The application of the program 
would be overseen by offices départementaux in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran, with the same 
plethora of civil society figures and local administrators as in the metropole. These would be 
complemented by representatives of the colonial regime and a very limited number of indigenous 
politicians appointed by the prefect.103 In the protectorates of the Maghreb, the comités coloniaux 
set up to implement the law were more strictly hierarchical, excluding local elected 
representatives in favour of figures from the colonial administration. Nevertheless, in line with 
metropolitan practices, they did include figures (of both genders) from civil society.104 
 In Indochina, Sarraut's internal consultation would result in a more liberal and participative 
vision of the organization of the program. In his submission, the resident superior of Cambodia 
did not propose any indigenous participation in the administration of the program but did seek 
to include representatives of civil society, including the president of the Society for the 
Protection of Children.105 In Cochinchina the governor proposed a directing committee that 
would include a whole swath of civil society representatives working alongside seven to ten 
representatives of the indigenous community. At a regional level, even more indigenous (of both 
genders) would be incorporated into the committees, with the possibility of an outright 
indigenous majority. Finally, at a local level, the governor proposed limiting the membership of 
the committee to the indigenous community, asserting that this would “be an effective way to 
bear witness to the interest shown by the authorities toward the indigenous.”106 Drawing on the 
reports of his territorial administrators, the governor-general issued a decree outlining the 
administration of the program in the colony. The conseil supérieur set up to direct the program 
across the colony included colonial officials, representatives of the chambers of commerce and 
agriculture, members of the organizations for large families, and two indigenous representatives 
appointed by the governor-general. This model was to be mirrored in each territory, where the 
relevant authorities would appoint two indigenous representatives. The power to constitute 
municipal committees was devolved to the administrations in the various territories.107 Where 
administrators in Africa sought to monopolize the committees governing the administration of a 
program they mostly rejected, the colonial authorities in Indochina opted for a participative (if by 
no means representative) model that they believed would be more effective not only in 
administrating the program but also in ensuring that indigenous populations felt that France was 
meeting its duties to the pupilles in the colonies. 
 
The question of whether France was indeed meeting its obligations in the colonies lay at the 
heart of the report compiled by the Ministry of the Colonies, by now under the leadership of the 
onetime governor-general of Indochina, Albert Sarraut, for the secretary-general of the Office 
National des Pupilles de la Nation in May 1921.108 The answer was ambiguous. The report 
reproduced (almost verbatim) and endorsed the accounts offered by colonial governors of the 
measures to be adopted in the colonies to reconcile the state's duty to the war orphans with its 
desire to respect indigenous cultural, familial, and societal structures. However, it is clear 
throughout the report that the ministry felt under pressure to defend its dilution of the universal 
right of the pupille de la Nation. The self-justificatory tone of the conclusion is startlingly clear in 
this regard: 
If our colonial empire has not done more for the children of those who sacrificed themselves for 
the cause of humanity, it is only out of discretion, of deference for certain imperious traditions 
that opposed accepting our helping gesture; but all our governors-general and governors will 
always ensure that the colonial orphans of the Great War, whether protected by their ancestral 
traditions or by the institution of the pupilles de la nation, are never abandoned.109 
 
The special regimes adopted in the colonies supposedly preserved the spirit if not the letter of 
the law. It is evident that for the Ministry of the Colonies this spirit was expressed not through a 
universal right to provision and priority but, rather, through a simple compensation for loss. 
Nevertheless, the ministry was keen to ensure that every territory of the French Empire was at 
least seen to be attempting to implement the program, ensuring that each administration set up a 
comité colonial des pupilles de la Nation, even if its activities were limited, if not non-existent. The 
closing sentence of the report is perhaps the most telling of all: “Each of our possessions will 
certainly do its best to apply the law to the maximum of its effects, both for the greater good of 
the pupilles it is destined to aid and for the strengthening of French influence, which its highly 
philanthropic goal and the sentiment of national gratitude it inspires can only favour.”110 Here 
the ministry conceives of the role of the program as dual, seeking both to compensate the 
prospective pupille and to reinforce French prestige and power. While it seems to suggest that 
these were purely complementary tasks, the body of the report and indeed the legislative and 
infrastructural framework that was emerging in the colonies bore testament to the tensions 
between these two missions. 
 
Conclusion 
We can see a variety of approaches across the empire that defied any attempt to apply a universal 
colonial policy to the program of the pupilles de la nation. Even the most basic and politically safe 
proposal to ensure that pupilles of European origin would receive the same treatment as their 
metropolitan counterparts proved extremely problematic in practice. In general terms, the delay 
in developing the complex legislative and institutional framework that governed the program 
across the empire put the European pupilles in the colonies at a distinct disadvantage.111 
Furthermore, their fate was very much dependent on where in the empire they resided. 
European pupilles in North Africa could expect to receive a near-metropolitan standard of 
provision within their local area, while their counterparts in Indochina would more than likely be 
shipped back to France. Both these approaches seemed to faithfully reproduce the notion of the 
pupille's right to compensation, even if transporting a young war orphan from Indochina to 
France may not necessarily have been a happy experience for the child in question. Elsewhere in 
the empire, the minuscule budgets dedicated to the program were testament to the lack of 
enthusiasm of colonial administrators for the program, reflected in what Sarraut described as “an 
excessive discretion of the colonial committees.”112 The boundaries between assistance and 
rights-based provision, so crucial to the program in the metropole, were somewhat blurred in 
these colonies, where financial constraints, the small numbers of pupilles involved, and the lack of 
interest of the authorities diluted the commitment to the program even for European pupilles. 
The regime applied in the “old colonies” also blurred these boundaries, depending heavily on a 
blend of a racially predicated form of cultural particularism that would see war orphans catered 
to by their own communities and the institutionalization of abandoned pupilles. In the empire, the 
rights of citizen pupilles remained dependent on their geographic location and skin colour. 
 
The case of the métis of Indochina also testifies to the importance of race in the application of 
the program in the colonies. The engagement of the authorities on behalf of the métis in certain 
territories was simultaneously inclusionary and exclusionary. On the one hand, the attempt to 
assimilate the métis to the European pupille or to some form of intermediary category with 
enhanced rights was meant to widen the rights-based patronage of the postvictory republic. On 
the other hand, the endorsement of race as a category by which provision should be adjudicated 
undermined the universal concept of the right of the pupille and militated against its application 
to indigenous populations. In practice, the particular attention shown to the métis may well have 
been to their detriment, with the policy of “repatriation” undoubtedly a traumatic experience for 
these children, who had been born and raised in Indochina. As Saada has shown, the category of 
pupille de la nation would itself constitute an important precedent for the eventual legal and social 
conceptualization of the relationship between the métis assimilated by the decree of 1928 and the 
French state.113 The policy of repatriation would also be the dominant feature of the French 
state's provision for assimilated métis, resulting in a mass movement of thousands of adults and at 
least forty-five hundred minors from their homeland to a metropole that was almost completely 
foreign to them.114 Thus, while the scope of the pupilles de la nation program in the colony was 
extremely limited, its repercussions may well have been felt by thousands of people. 
 Above all, however, it was the provision for indigenous pupilles that would prove most 
problematic for colonial administrators. While in certain cases, North Africa, Cambodia, and 
Cochinchina, for example, the egalitarian spirit of the law was preserved, at least theoretically, in 
most of the empire association triumphed over assimilation. Across the complex administrative 
patchwork that constituted the French Empire, where distinct political structures subjugated 
radically different indigenous populations, French administrators developed a wide range of 
policy proposals that shared a common goal: the minimization of the state's obligation to the 
child victims of war. In societies as distinct as French West Africa, Madagascar, New Caledonia, 
and Annam, local communal culture was evoked to counter the notion that the state had a duty 
of care to its war orphans. Their evocation of the sanctity of indigenous societal, familial, and 
power structures was disingenuous at best, downright cynical at worst, while their evacuation of 
the role of the indigenous father was steeped in the tropes of racial prejudice. And yet, their 
argument that an overweening intervention by the state would be perceived as an attack on 
indigenous culture was not without a grain of truth. The lack of an infrastructure comparable to 
that in the metropole, outside of certain major colonial cities, meant that any attempt by the 
colonial state to fully meet its responsibilities to colonial pupilles would have required extracting 
the child from its home community and inserting it into a foreign and, more than likely, 
institutionalized environment. In fact many other ayants droits in the empire were extremely 
reticent in claiming their rights in the interwar period as they feared any deepening of their 
relationship with the authoritarian colonial state.115 Even in societies where the legal distinctions 
between the indigenous and European pupilles were minimal, European pupilles were 
disproportionately dominant, as indigenous families remained unaware of the program and/or 
unable or, crucially, unwilling to enroll their children. In January 1934 the Algerian department of 
Constantine counted 1,686 pupilles of European origin, compared to 339 indigenous pupilles. At a 
time when roughly 7 percent of the population of the department was European, 83 percent of 
the pupilles were of European origin.116 Subsequent colonial experiments in mass provision for 
favoured categories of children, whether in Indochina or in Réunion, had a disastrous effect on 
the lives of thousands of children and are perhaps cautionary tales of what could have happened 
had colonial administrators fully embraced the spirit of the program.117 
 
Perhaps prospective pupilles and their mothers, a group largely absent from the considerations of 
colonial administrators, were better served by the neglect of the state than they would have been 
by strong-armed state intervention. In any case, the choice between an overzealous state seeking 
to tear a child away from its home environment and a negligent state seeking primarily to avoid 
its duties was hardly the only choice available to colonial administrators in the colonies. In the 
end, a combination of parsimony, political expediency, and racial prejudice meant that many 
pupilles de l'empire received little to no special compensation for their loss, for better or for worse. 
Their story bears testament to an empire that, despite its many internal differences and practices, 
remained resolutely committed to distinguishing on a racial basis among its populations, even 
those most worthy of its attention. The very logic of French imperialism militated against any 
extension, no matter how minor, of a form of total equality that would disrupt the social, 
economic, and political underpinnings of the colonial hierarchy. Thus the interwar empire had 
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